



Farrar v. Hobby, 
_U.S._, 92 D.A.R. 16669, 
No. 91-990 (Dec. 14, 1992). 
Party Winning Nominal 
Damages in Civil Rights Action 
is Prevailing Party, But May 
Not Be Entitled to Fees 
In an underlying proceeding, petition-
ers sought $17 million in compensatory 
damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections 
1983 and 1985; the complaint, which 
named six Texas public officials as defen-
dants, was based on an alleged deprivation 
of liberty and property without due pro-
cess by means of conspiracy and mali-
cious prosecution. Although the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of 
Texas awarded petitioners only $1 in dam-
ages, it awarded them $280,000 in attorneys' 
fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988, the 
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Award Act of 
1976. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the fee award, holding that peti-
tioners were not prevailing parties and 
were therefore ineligible for fees under 
section 1988. The Fifth Circuit noted that 
even if an award of nominal damages rep-
resented some sort of victory, it was a 
technical victory so insignificant as to be 
insufficient to support prevailing party 
status. 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted that to be considered a prevailing 
party within the meaning of section 1988, 
a plaintiff must be able to point to a reso-
lution of the dispute which changes the 
legal relationship between itself and the 
defendant. According to the court, "a 
plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on 
the merits of his claim materially alters the 
legal relationship between the parties by 
modifying the defendant's behavior in a 
way that directly benefits the plaintiff." 
Referring to its previous rulings, the Court 
noted that an award of nominal damages 
for deprivation of the absolute right to 
procedural due process recognizes the im-
portance to organized society that this 
right be scrupulously observed, while re-
maining true to the principle that substan-
tial damages should be awarded only to 
compensate actual injury. Following from 
this premise, the Court held that a plaintiff 
who wins nominal damages is a prevailing 
party under section 1988: "[a] judgment 
for damages in any amount, whether com-
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pensatory or nominal, modifies the 
defendant's behavior for the plaintiff's 
benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an 
amount of money he otherwise would not 
pay." 
Although holding that the prevailing 
party inquiry does not tum on the magni-
tude of the relief obtained, Justice Thomas-
writing for the majority on this issue-
noted that it does bear on the propriety of 
fees awarded under section 1988, noting 
that once civil rights litigation materially 
alters the legal relationship between the 
parties, "the degree of the plaintiff's over-
all success goes to the reasonableness" of 
a fee award. The majority noted that peti-
tioners received nominal damages instead 
of the $17 million in compensatory dam-
ages they had sought; "[t]his litigation 
accomplished little beyond giving peti-
tioners 'the moral satisfaction of knowing 
that a federal court concluded that [their] 
rights had been violated' in some unspec-
ified way." Accordingly, the majority con-
cluded that even though they technically 
"prevailed" under section 1988, petition-
ers were not entitled to receive attorneys' 
fees in this case, in light of the degree of 
the success obtained. 
Justice White, joined by Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens, dissented from the 
majority's decision that plaintiff deserved 
no fees in this case. "That issue was nei-
ther presented in the petition for certiorari 
nor briefed by petitioners." The dissent 
would have remanded to the trial court for 




Green v. Anderson, 
No. Civ. S-92-2118. 
Groups Seek to Block 
New State Welfare Law 
On December 21, a class action was 
filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of California by a group 
of California residents who moved or re-
located to California within the preceding 
twelve months and sought welfare bene-
fits under the Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) program. Pursuant 
to new section 11450.03 of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code, until an applicant 
for AFDC has resided in the state for 
twelve consecutive months, the applicant's 
level of benefits may not exceed what the 
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family would have received in the state of 
prior residence. This new residency re-
quirement became effective upon ap-
proval by the U.S. Secretary of Health and 
Human Services on October 29, and the 
California Department of Social Services 
(DSS) began applying it shortly thereafter. 
Plaintiffs contend that the statute vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the 
U.S. Constitution; further, plaintiffs point 
out that, for the last twenty years, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has "consistently struck 
down as unconstitutional state statutes 
that provide reduced government benefits 
to new state residents." In response, DSS 
Director Eloise Anderson claims that prior 
court rulings only overturned laws that 
completely denied benefits to new resi-
dents, while section 11450.03 seeks only 
to limit the amount newcomers receive. 
On December 22, the court granted 
plaintiffs' motion for temporary restrain-
ing order, blocking application of the du-
rational residency requirement; at this 




Johnson v. Bradley, 
4 Cal. 4th 389, 92 D.A.R. 17340, 
No. S021118 (Dec. 24, 1992). 
Proposition 73 Does Not Preclude 
City From Adopting Public 
Funding Provisions Of 
Campaign Reform Measure 
Measure H, adopted by the voters of 
the City of Los Angeles in 1990, amended 
the city charter and created a comprehens-
ive campaign, election, and ethics reform 
plan by setting forth limitations on cam-
paign contributions, limitations on the 
total amount of contributions that a candi-
date may accept in any election, prohibi-
tions on the transfer of contributions be-
tween candidates or their controlled com-
mittees, required disclosure of candidates' 
economic interests and income, limita-
tions on gifts and honoraria that public 
officials may accept, and campaign spend-
ing limitations, and by providing for the 
creation of a city ethics commission to 
oversee, administer, and enforce the new 
ethics code. 




Johnson, Senator Quentin Kopp, and Los 
Angeles City Council member Ernani 
Bernardi-sought to invalidate and enjoin 
enforcement of Measure H, to the extent 
the measure provides for the partial public 
funding of campaigns for city elective of-
fices. Petitioners grounded their challenge 
on Proposition 73, a statewide initiative 
which was cosponsored by Johnson and 
Kopp and passed by the voters in the June 
1988 election. Among other things, Prop-
osition 73 bans public financing of any 
election campaign. Specifically, Proposi-
tion 73 added Government Code section 
85300, which provides that no public of-
ficer shall expend and no candidate shall 
accept any public moneys for the purpose 
of seeking elective office. 
As part of its determination whether 
there is an actual conflict between general 
state law and charter city authority, the 
court declined to address an initial claim 
raised by amicus curiae that section 85300 
has been rendered inoperative as a result 
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' 
decision in Service Employees Interna-
tional Union, et al. v. Fair Political Prac-
tices Commission, 955 F.2d 13 I 2 (I 992), 
which struck down Proposition 73's con-
tribution limits applicable to all cam-
paigns for election to state and local of-
fice. [12:2&3 CRLR 275] Instead, the 
court proceeded with its analysis, based in 
part on its finding that the case before it 
presents "an important issue of constitu-
tional Jaw that potentially affects all char-
ter cities." 
The court then considered whether sec-
tion 85300 qualifies as a matter of "state-
wide concern," noting that if the state stat-
ute does not address as a matter of state-
wide concern, the conflicting charter city 
measure is a "municipal affair" and is 
"beyond the reach of legislative enact-
ment." If section 85300 does address a 
statewide concern, the court must consider 
whether it is both reasonably related to the 
resolution of that concern, and narrowly 
tailored to limit incursion into legitimate 
municipal interests. 
The court noted that petitioners pre-
sented several alternative arguments in 
support of their claim that section 85300 
addresses a statewide concern. However, 
the only argument in which the court 
found merit was petitioners' claim that the 
integrity of the electoral process-at both 
the state and local level-is a statewide 
concern. However, in considering whether 
section 85300 is reasonably related to the 
resolution of this statewide concern, the 
court found that petitioners "cite[ d] noth-
ing to support the proposition that section 
85300's ban on public funding of political 
campaigns advances in any way the goal 
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of enhancing the integrity of the electoral 
process. In fact, the opposite appears to be 
true .... [A)ssuming spending limitations 
may enhance the integrity of the electoral 
process, a ban on public funding would 
actually frustrate achievement of that 
goal." Accordingly, the court concluded 
that "section 85300 is not reasonably re-
lated to the statewide concern of enhanc-
ing the integrity of the electoral process. 
Having reached this conclusion, we need 
not address whether the statute is also 
narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary in-
cursion into legitimate areas of local con-
cern." 
Clark v. Burleigh, 
4 Cal. 4th 474, 92 D.A.R. 17309, 
No. S020854 (Dec. 24, 1992). 
State Regulation Governing 
Statement By Candidates for Local 
Nonpartisan Elective Office Does 
Not Violate First Amendment 
In this proceeding, the California Su-
preme Court reviewed the constitutional-
ity of Elections Code section JOO 12.1, 
which prescribes the content of a statutory 
"candidate's statement" that a candidate 
for local judicial office may prepare and 
file for inclusion in the voter's pamphlet; 
the statute provides that such a statement 
must be limited to the candidate's name, 
age, occupation, and a brief description of 
the candidate's own background and qual-
ifications, and must not refer to those of 
other candidates for the office. Plaintiff, 
Monterey County Registrar of Voters, 
filed an action for declaratory relief, seek-
ing a judicial determination whether the 
candidate's statement submitted by Judge 
William Burleigh, which made specific 
references to another candidate, violated 
section JOO I 2.1 and, if so, whether the 
statute is unconstitutional; Judge Burleigh 
filed a cross-petition for writ of mandate 
to compel the registrar to publish his state-
ment as written. The trial court found that 
Judge Hurleigh's statement violated sec-
tion I 0012.1, upheld the constitutionality 
of section I 0012.1, struck from the state-
ment the references to the other candidate, 
and directed the Registrar to print the re-
mainder in the voter's pamphlet. On an 
appeal filed by Judge Burleigh, the Sixth 
District Court of Appeal reversed the de-
cision, holding section 10012.1 unconsti-
tutional on the ground that it violates the 
free speech guarantee of the First Amend-
ment. 
The California Supreme Court initially 
noted that section I 00 I 2.1 implicates a 
candidate's First Amendment rights, since 
the amendment '"has its fullest and most 
urgent application"' to political speech. 
However, the court noted that "[n)othing 
in the Constitution requires the Govern-
ment freely to grant access to all who wish 
to exercise their right to free speech on 
every type of Government property with-
out regard to the nature of the property or 
to the disruption that might be caused by 
the speaker's activities." 
The court noted that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has adopted a forum analysis as a 
means of determining when the govern-
ment's interest in limiting the use of its 
property to its intended purpose out-
weighs the interest of those wishing to use 
the property for other purposes; the extent 
to which the government may control ac-
cess depends on the nature of the relevant 
forum. For purposes of such forum analy-
sis, the U.S. Supreme Court has divided 
all public property into three categories: 
(I) The traditional public forum is a 
place that by long tradition has been used 
by the public at large for the free exchange 
of ideas; laws regulating the content of 
speech in such forums are subject to strict 
scrutiny. 
(2) The designated public forum is 
property that the government has opened 
for expressive activity by part or all of the 
public; a content-based regulation of speech 
in a designated public forum is subject to 
strict scrutiny. 
(3) The nonpublic forum is all remain-
ing public property; limitations on expres-
sive activity conducted in a nonpublic 
forum need only be reasonable, as Jong as 
the limitation is content-neutral. 
The court determined that the voter's 
pamphlet is not a traditional public forum, 
since it is a creature of recent legislation. 
The court also found that the pamphlet is 
not a designated public forum, since the 
government does not create a designated 
public forum by inaction or by permitting 
limited discourse, but only by intention-
ally opening a nontraditional forum for 
public discourse. Accordingly, the court 
noted that the pamphlet constitutes a non-
public forum, which may be reserved for 
its intended purposes as long as the regu-
lation on speech is reasonable and not an 
effort to suppress expression merely be-
cause public officials oppose the speaker's 
view. 
The court opined that the primary pur-
pose of the candidate's statement is to give 
the voters at least a minimal amount of 
basic information about the background 
and qualifications of little-known candi-
dates. "In light of that purpose it is plainly 
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reasonable for the Legislature to provide 
in section I 0012.1 that the statement 
should not also be used by the candidates 
as a partisan campaign device to attack 
their opponents." The court also noted that 
section I 0012.1 restricts on! y this one chan-
nel of communication with the voters; nu-
merous alternative channels remain open 
to candidates for local judicial office that 
do not bar criticism of opponents. Finally, 
the court found that the challenged restric-
tion is viewpoint-neutral, and does not 
constitute an effort to suppress expression 
based on content. Accordingly, the court 
held that section I 0012.1 does not violate 
the free speech guarantee of the First 
Amendment. 
The court briefly addressed Judge 
Hurleigh's contention that section 10012.1 
denies him equal protection of the laws 
under the Fourteenth Amendment because 
candidates for nonjudicial local offices are 
not subject to its restrictions. The court 
dismissed this argument, noting that on 
government property which constitutes a 
nonpublic forum, not all speech is equally 
situated, and the state may draw distinc-
tions which relate to the special purpose 
for which the property is used. The court 
noted that Judge Burleigh did not have a 
fundamental right to attack his opponent 
in this nonpublic forum; therefore, the 
state's prohibition against such attacks 
will be upheld if it is rationally related to 
a legitimate state purpose. As noted above, 
the court concluded that the restriction is 
rationally related to the legislature's legit-
imate purpose of assisting the voters by 
, providing them with basic information 
about the background and qualifications 
of little-known candidates for local judi-
cial office; accordingly, the court held that 
section I 0012.1 does not violate the equal 
protection clause . 
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